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Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section
105 of the Salt Lake City Traffic code (1984); Count II, Obedience
To Semiphore At Crosswalk, an infraction, in violation of Section
084 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984); and Count III, Open
Container In Vehicle, an infraction, in violation of Section 109 of
the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984), in the Third Circuit Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G.
Grant, presiding.
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TEXT OF STATUTES

U.C.A. §76-2-302. Compulsion:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use
or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person,
which force or threatened force a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would
not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by
this section shall be unavailable to a
person who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly places himself in a situation in
which it is probable that he will be
subject to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by
reason of the presence of her husband, to
any presumption of compulsion or to any
defense of compulsion except as in
subsection (1) provided.
U.C.A. §76-2-401:
Conduct which i s j u s t i f i e d i s a defense t o
p r o s e c u t i o n for any offense based on the
c o n d u c t . The defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n may
be c l a i m e d :
(5) When the a c t o r ' s conduct i s j u s t i f i e d
for any o t h e r reason under the laws of t h i s
state.
U.C.A. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 ( 6 ) :
(a)The person to be tested may, at his own
expense, have a physician of his own choice
administer a chemical test in addition to
the test or tests administered at the
direction of a peace officer.
(b)The failure or inability to obtain the
additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or
tests taken at the direction of a peace
officer, or preclude or delay these test or
tests to be taken at the direction of a
peace officer.

(c)The additional test shall be subsequent
to the test or tests administered at the
direction of a peace officer.
17-A M.R.S.A. §103(1) :
Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid imminent physical harm
to himself or another is justifiable if the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such
harm outweigh, according to ordinary
standards of reasonableness, the harm
sought to be prevented by the statute
defining the crime charged.
The trial court erred when it 'refused to
give the instruction because he determined,
as a matter of law, that a defendant who
denies that he committed the crime cannot
also assert the inconsistent defense that
he did commit the crime because he
"believe [d] it to be necessary to avoid
imminent physical harm to himself or
another,"1 495 A.2d at 338 (citations
omitted) .

Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing
provisions of this article defining
justifiable use of physical force, conduct
which would otherwise constitute an
offense is justifiable and not criminal
when:
2. Such conduct is necessary as an
emergency measure to avoid an imminent
public or private situation occasioned or
developed through no fault of the actor,
and which is of such gravity that,
according to ordinary standard of
intelligence and morality, the desirability
and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly
outweigh the desirability of avoiding the
injury sought to be prevented by the
statute defining the offense in issue. The
necessity and justifiability of such
conduct may not rest upon considerations
pertaining only to the morality and
advisability of the statute, either in its
- v -

general application or with respect to its
application to a particular class of cases
arising thereunder. Whenever evidence
relating to the defense of justification
under this subdivision is offered by the
defendant, the court shall rule as a matter
of law whether the claimed facts and
circumstances would, if established,
constitute a defense.
Salt Lake City Traffic Code §084:
No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the
instructions of any traffic control device
placed in accordance with the provisions of
this title, unless at the time he is
otherwise directed by a police officer, or
subject to the exceptions granted the
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
in this title.
Salt Lake City Traffic Code §105:
1. It is unlawful and punishable as
provided in this section for any person to
operate or be in actual physical control of
a vehicle within this city if the person
has a blood or breath alcohol content of
.08 percent by weight as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control,
or if the person under the influence of
alcohol or any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol or any drug to a
degree which renders the person incapable
of safely driving a vehicle within this
city.
2.
The fact that a person charged with
violating this section is or has been
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug
does not constitute a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
Salt Lake City Traffic Code §109:
A. No person shall drink any alcohol
beverage while driving a motor vehicle or
- vi -

while a passenger in a motor vehicle,
whether the vehicle is moving, stopped, or
parked on any street or highway.
B. No person shall keep, carry, possess,
transport, or allow another to keep, carry,
possess or transport in the passenger
compartment of a motor vehicle, when the
vehicle is on any public street or highway,
any container whatsoever which contains any
alcoholic beverage, if the container has
been opened, the seal thereon broken, or
the contents of the container partially
consumed.
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
"No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or
imunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws."
Article 1, Section 7, the Constitution of Utah:
"No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law."
Model Penal Code, General Provision and Commentaries:
Section 3.02. Justification Generally:
Choice of Evils.
(l)Conduct that the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or to another is justifiable,
provided that:

- vii -

(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought
to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law
defining the offense provides exceptions or
defenses dealing with the specific
situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed does not otherwise
plainly appear.
(2)When the actor was reckless or negligent
in bringing about the situation requiring a
choice of harms or evils or in appraising
the necessity for his conduct, the
justification afforded by this Section is
unavailable in a prosecution for any
offense for which reckless or negligence,
as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability.
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b a s i s f o r such a

which

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-26 (2) (a) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal
action may take an appeal to the Utah court of Appeals from a final
judgment of conviction of a Class B Misdemeanor by a Circuit Court.
In the case at hand, final judgment and conviction were rendered by
the Honorable Judge Paul G. Grant, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake
Department, Salt Lake County, Utah.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Case No. 880401-CA
Priority #2

JON B. BUXTON,
De fe n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of the
Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for Count I,
Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Section 105 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984); Count II,
Obedience To Semiphore At Crosswalk, an infraction, in violation of
Section 084 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984); and Count
III, Open Container In Vehicle, an infraction, in violation of
Section 109 of the Salt Lake City Traffic Code (1984).

The

defendant/appellant, represented by his attorney of record, CHARLES
F. LOYD, JR., was found guilty through a jury trial. The court
sentenced the defendant on Count I to 180 days jail and $1100.00
fines and fees, with 170 days jail suspended upon twelve months
probation to the court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 13, 1988, the defendant/appellant, JON B.
BUXTON, with his passenger Glen Thomas, drove to the residence of
Alan Goodrich at 3030 South West Temple in South Salt Lake City. A
barbeque was planned and they began fixing dinner.

Thomas became

ill with what appeared to be a recurrence of heart trouble. At
about 8:00 p.m. medical attention was deemed necessary, but there
was no telephone in the house nor immediately nearby.

It was

decided that Buxton would drive Thomas to the hospital as Goodrich
was caring for several young children.
While driving northbound on State Street Buxton was stopped
at 575 South State Street by Officer Kirk of the Salt Lake City
Police Department for speeding and running a red light at 600
South.

After Kirk advised Buxton of the reason for the traffic

stop, Buxton explained that Thomas was ill and needed medical
attention.

An ambulance was summoned and did transport Thomas to

the Veterans Administration Hospital, where he spent the next three
days.
During conversation with Buxton, Kirk noticed an odor of
alcohol on Buxton's breath.

Kirk conducted field sobriety tests and

arrested Buxton for drunk driving.

At the Metropolitan Hall of

Justice, using the standard DUI Report Form (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 ) ,
Kirk advised Buxton that he was under arrest and requested that
Buxton submit to a breath test.

Buxton consented to taking a breath

test, the result of which was .202.

-2 -

ARGUMENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUE I
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE RESULTS OF THE
INTOXILYZER BREATH TEST, GROUNDED UPON THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, §7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH.
SUMMARY
Defendant argues that under the procedure established by
the DUI Report Form (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5), an arrested individual
who physically refuses to submit to a chemical test is read an
admonition which informs him that he is permitted to have an
additional chemical test administered by a physician of his own
choice.

The right to an additional chemical test is statutory,

U.C.A. §41-6-44.10(6) (1953 as amended).

An arrested individual who

readily agrees to the police officer's request to submit to a
chemical test, however, is not informed of his right to an
additional chemical test, under the procedure established by the DUI
Report Form.

The result is that arrested individuals who

immediately consent to take a chemical test administered by a police
officer are not informed of their right to an additional chemical
test and thus are accorded less statutory protection than those
arrested individuals who initially refuse to submit to a chemical
test.

The inequitable result is unfair to cooperative individuals

and is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §7 of the
Constitution of Utah.

Officer Kirk testified that he followed the procedure of
the DUI Report Form, in Section X, Chemical Tests, and that Buxton
consented to take a breath test after he was read the section
concerning the Utah implied Consent Law.

(Transcript p. 27). Kirk

did not read Buxton the admonition that followed concerning
additional chemical tests, (p. 32)(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).
Officer Cheever, who actually operated the Intoxilyzer 4011ASA
breath test machine, also testified he did not inform Buxton of the
admonition which provides notice of the right to an additional
chemical test.

(p. 47-8).

Kirk testified that where an arrested

individual refuses the test he does read them the admonition.
(p. 104).
If you refuse the test, it will not be given,
however I must warn you that if you refuse, your
license or permit to drive a motor vehicle may be
revoked for one year with no provision for a limited
driver's license. After you have taken this test,
you will be permitted to have a physician of your
own choice administer a test at your own expense, in
addition to the one I have requested you to submit
to, so long as it does not delay the test or tests
requested by me. Upon your request, I will make
available to you the results of the test if you take
it. (emphasis added)
ARGUMENT
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
determines what procedural process is necessary if the government
deprives an individual of life, liberty or property.

The Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution requires that similarly situated individuals be treated
similarly by the government.

Procedural Due Process deals with the
-4 -

adjudication of the individual claims, while Equal Protection deals
with legislative classification.

The two concepts are sometimes

interchangable, however, and it is a well settled rule that the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses equal protection
principles.

Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 91

L.Ed.2d 527 n.2 (1986);

Matthews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 97

S.Ct. 431, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 n.l (1976);

Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.

749, 95 S.Ct 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975);

Boiling v. Sharpe, 347

U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884, (1954).
In Utah, under U.C.A. 41-6-44.10(6) (1953 as amended), an
individual is accorded a statutory right to an additional chemical
test following an arrest for Driving Under the influence if he has
submitted to the test administered at the police officer's request.

(a)The person to be tested may, at his own
expense, have a physician of his own choice
administer a chemical test in addition to
the test or tests administered at the
direction of a peace officer.
(b)The failure or inability to obtain the
additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or
tests taken at the direction of a peace
officer, or preclude or delay these test or
tests to be taken at the direction of a
peace officer.
(c)The additional test shall be subsequent
to the test or tests administered at the
direction of a peace officer.
The statute does not require that the individual be notified by the
police officer of his right to the additional chemical test. The

DUI report form used by the Salt Lake City Police Department,
however, does provide notice of the right to an additional test to
those individuals who initially refuse to take the test requested by
the officer.

Following the initial refusal, the officer reads the

first admonition, which informs the individual of the right to an
additional chemical test.

The individual may then agree to take the

test requested by the officer, and subsequently request the
opportunity to have an additional test administered by a physician
of his own choice .
Because some individuals are advised of the right to an
additional chemical test, all individuals should be so informed.
There is no legal basis for procedurally discriminating between
those individuals who readily comply with the officer's request to
take a chemical test, those who refuse,and those who first refuse
and then comply.

The procedure as implemented by the DUI report

form in fact penalizes the cooperative individuals.
There is discrimination and unfairness in the application
of the statute to individual cases which violates procedural due
process.

Process, in this case the notice of the availability of an

additional chemical test, is furnished to those individuals who
initially refuse to take the chemical test. We are not talking
about process that could or should be furnished, we are talking
about process that is actually furnished to some individuals. And
inherent in the concept of due process is fairness, a requirement
that each individual be accorded the same range of rights as all
others in the same situation.

-6 -

Several jurisdictions have held that a motorist charged
with an alcohol driving offense does not have right, absent specific
statutory language to the contrary, to notice of a statutory right
to an independent chemical test.

See Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106

(Alaska 1979); Farmington v. Joseph, 575 P.2d 104 (N.M. Ct. App.
1978).

In neither case, however, nor in any case from another

jurisdiction, were some individuals notified of the right to an
independent chemical test and other individuals not notified.
present case is distinguishable:

The

some are notified and some are

not, and due process is violated because those who readily consent
are not notified.
The remedy for failing to notify an individual of the right
to an independent chemical test is dismissal, People v. Koval, 124
N.W.2d 274 (Mich. 1963), or exclusion of the chemical test evidence
obtained by the police officer, State v. Creson, 576 P.2d 814 (Or.
Ct. App. 1978).

See generally 45 ALR4th 1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE II
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING DEPENDANT'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION, ON
JUSTIFICATION PURSUANT TO U.C.A. §76-2-401,
AFTER THE DEFENDANT PRODUCED EVIDENCE WHICH
PROVIDED THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR SUCH A
DEFENSE.
SUMMARY
Defendant argues that U.C.A. §76-2-401 (5)(1953 as amended)
should be read to include the defense of necessity or, in the
alternative, that U.C.A. §76-2-302(1)(1953 as amended) should be
enlarged to include any forces which coerce a person to engage in

proscribed conduct.

The defense of necessity promulgated in the

Model Penal Code is logically consistent with Utah's compulsion
defense, and rationality and justice demand its inclusion in Utah
criminal law.

A person who breaks the law to avoid a greater harm

caused by an outside agency is no different from a person who breaks
the law to avoid a threat of physical harm caused by another
person.

To deny an affirmative defense to the first person is

unfair and serves no purpose under the criminal law.
Jon Buxton testified he was driving Glen Thomas to the
hospital when stopped on State Street by Officer Kirk.

(p. 97).

Shortly before, at the residence of Allen Goodrich, Thomas began
experiencing chest pains, shoulder pains, painful spasms, and
shortness of breath, to such an extent that is appeared he was
having a heart attack.

(p. 82, 88, 95). Goodrich, who does not

have a phone at his residence and testified there were no phones
nearby, insisted Buxton take Thomas to the hospital right away.
(p. 89). Buxton thought it was a life threatening situation.
(p. 97). After the traffic stop Thomas was taken by ambulance to
the Veteran's Administration Hospital where he spent three days.
Based on the facts introduced or offered into evidence,
defendant requested an instruction from the Model Penal Code on the
defense of necessity:
Conduct which is justified as a defense to
prosecution for any offense based on the
conduct: Conduct which the actor believes
to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or another is justifiable provided
that the harm of evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought
-8 -

to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged. Therefore, if the
defendant proves to your satisfaction the
above elements or justification did exist
and the prosecution does not negate the
defense of justification beyond a
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to
return a verdict of not guilty." (p. 109).
The defense cited to justification, U.C.A. §76-2-401,
compulsion, §76-2-302, State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986);
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) and the Model Penal Code.
The court refused the proferred instruction.

(p. 109).

ARGUMENT
Two questions are posed by this issue.

First, does U.C.A.

§76-2-401(5) (1953 as amended) state the general principle of
justification in terms that include the defense of necessity?

The

defense of necessity, also generally known as "choice of evils" or
"competing harms", was available at common law, is recognized in the
Model Penal Code, and is codified in a number of states and
available through case law precedent in others.

Second, if the

affirmative defense of necessity is available under U.C.A.
§76-2-401(5) (1953 as amended), is it available as a defense to
Driving Under the Influence?

The courts of several states have held

that necessity is an affirmative defense to Driving Under the
Influence, that the instruction may be submitted to the jury after
evidence of an adequate factual basis is received.

-9 -

U.C.A. §76-2-401(1953 as amended) p r o v i d e s in p e r t i n e n t
part

that:
Conduct which i s j u s t i f i e d i s a defense t o
p r o s e c u t i o n for any offense based on the
c o n d u c t . The defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n may
be c l a i m e d :
(5) When the a c t o r ' s conduct i s j u s t i f i e d
for any o t h e r r e a s o n under the laws of t h i s
state .
U.C.A. §76-2-302. Compulsion:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use
or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person,
which force or threatened force a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would
not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by
this section shall be unavailable to a
person who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly places himself in a situation in
which it is probable that he will be
subject to duress.
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by
reason of the presence of her husband, to
any presumption of compulsion or to any
defense of compulsion except as in
subsection (1) provided.

It is here argued that U.C. A. §76-2-401(5) states the general
principle of justification under which the defense of necessity is
included, and that the inclusion of the defense of necessity is
consistent with the legislative intent of Utah's compulsion defense.
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The defense of necessity was available at common law. See
The William Gray, 29 F.Cas. 1300 (C.C.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17, 694);
United States v. Ashton, 24 F.Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,
470);

Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687; W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr.,

Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 627-640 (1986).
The defense of necessity, or the choice of evils defense,
is codified in the Model Penal Code, which served as a source for
the Utah Criminal Code (1973 as amended).

See American Law

Institute, Model Penal Code, General Provisions, Part I, Article 3,
Section 3.02 (1980); Model Penal Code, Commentaries, Part I, Article
3, Section 3.02 (1980).

Section 3.02 provides in pertinent part

that:
Section 3.02.

Justification Generally:

Choice of Evils.

(1) Conduct that the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or
to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense
charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining
the offense provides exceptions or defenses
dealing with the specific situation involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the
justification claimed does not otherwise plainly
appear.
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in
bringing about the situation requiring a choice
of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity
for his conduct, the justification afforded by
this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for
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any offense for which reckless or negligence, as
the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability.
As the Commentaries point out, this formulation of the principle of
necessity is subject to a number of limitations.

First, the actor

must actually believe that his conduct is necessary to avoid an
evil.

Model Penal Code, Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 11.

Second, the

necessity must arise from an attempt by the actor to avoid an evil
or harm that is greater than the evil or harm sought to be avoided
by the law defining the offense charged.

Commentaries at p. 12.

Third, the balancing of evils is not committed to the private
judgment of the actor; it is an issue for determination at the
trial

IQ.

Fourth, under subsections(1)(b) and (l)(c), the general

choice evils defense cannot succeed if the issue of competing values
has been previously foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice,
as when some provision of the law deals explicitly with the specific
situation that presents the choice of evils or a legislative purpose
to exclude the claimed justification otherwise appears.
And as is elsewhere made clear, justification is

K3. at 13.

an affirmative

defense, with the burden of production falling to the defendant and
the burden of persuasion of the prosecution, ^d. at 6.

The authors

of the Model Penal Code write that such a formulation of the
principle of necessity reflects the judgment that such a
qualification on criminal liability, like the general requirements
of culpability, is essential to the rationality and justice of the
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criminal law, and is appropriately addressed in a Penal Code.
Id. at 9.

Finally, the Model Penal Code §2.09 is the source of

Utah's compulsion defense, U.C.A. §76-2-302, the sole difference
being the Model Penal Code §2.09(4) references to §3.02, the
necessity defense.
An alternate formulation of the principle of necessity,
followed by a minority of states, is the New York Statute, N.Y.
§35.05, which in pertinent part provides:
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing
provisions of this article defining justifiable
use of physical force, conduct which would
otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable
and not criminal when:
2. Such conduct is necessary as an
emergency measure to avoid an imminent public
or private situation occasioned or developed
through no fault of the actor, and which is of
such gravity that, according to ordinary
standard of intelligence and morality, the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such
injury clearly outweigh the desirability of
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by
the statute defining the offense in issue. The
necessity and justifiability of such conduct
may not rest upon considerations pertaining
only to the morality and advisability of the
statute, either in its general application or
with respect to its application to a particular
class of cases arising thereunder. Whenever
evidence relating to the defense of
justification under this subdivision is offered
by the defendant, the court shall rule as a
matter of law whether the claimed facts and
circumstances would, if established, constitute
a defense .
The New York law adds the requirements that the conduct be an
"emergency measure to avoid an imminent" injury and that the
necessity for action be occasioned or developed "through no fault
the actor".

Id. at 19, 20.

Numerous states have made the defense of necessity
statutory or available through case law.

See generally American Law

Institute Model Penal Code, Commentaries, Vol. 2, p. 18 (1980);
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, Vol. I,
p. 627-640 (1986); State v. Jacobs, 371 So.2d 801 (La. 1979).
There do not appear to be any Utah cases in which the
specific defense of necessity has been considered.

No annotations

to O.C.A. §76-2-401(5) (1953 as amended) were located.

Nevertheless,

the defense of necessity should be read into U.C.A. §76-2-401(5) in
the interest of justice.

The necessity defense embodies the same

theory found in the compulsion defense, U.C.A. §76-2-301(1), that a
person should not be criminally liable for breaking the criminal law
if in so doing the person avoids or prevents a greater harm from
occurring, but in a situation created by natural forces or an
outside agency,

in the compulsion situation, the actor acts to

avoid physical harm threatened by another person, and the defense is
available so long as the actor does not place himself Ln the
situation intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.

Similarly, in

the necessity situation the actor acts to avoid physical harm to
himself or a third person threatened by natural forces or an outside
agency,

in each case the actor breaks the law to avoid a more

harmful result, with the net benefit accruing to society.

The

policy supporting each defense is the utilitarian benefit the
outcome provides society.

Necessity and compulsion are closely

related affirmative defenses, different only in that under the
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n e c e s s i t y defense the a c t o r i s coerced by a harm emanating from an
o u t s i d e agency or n a t u r a l f o r c e s .

See Cleveland v. M u n i c i p a l i t y of

Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981);

People v. S t r o c k , 623 P.2d

42 (Colo. 1 9 8 1 ) .
There is, additionally, a line of cases in Utah which
suggest that the defense of necessity should be available to a
criminal defendant.

Beginning with the defendant's constitutional

right to present all competent evidence in his defense, the courts
have found that, when the defendant has presented sufficient
evidence of an affirmative defense to entertain reasonable doubt, he
is entitled to have an instruction on the law:
[The] defendant's right to present all
competent evidence in his defense is a
right guaranteed by the due process clause
of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7,
as well as our Federal Constitution, 14th
Amendment-. It is also axiomatic that where
the defendant has asserted a defense to
justify or excuse the criminal charge, and
where there is reasonable basis in the
evidence to support it, the viability of
the defense then becomes a question of fact
and the jury should be charged regarding
it. Where, however, there is no reasonable
basis in the evidence to support the
defense or its essential components, it is
not error for the trial judge to either
refuse to instruct the jury as to the
defense, or to instruct them to disregard
it.
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d

33 (Utah 1981)(citations omitted).

In

State v. Harding the court considered whether the defense of
compulsion, U.C. A. §76-2-302 (1953 as amended) was applicable to
prison escape.

The trial court refused to instruct the jury to
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consider the defense, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision
based on lack of evidence as to the elements of the defense. The
court, however, did not preclude application of the statutory
compulsion defense to the crime of escape.
The case of State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986) is
illustrative of the position which the common law and the Model
Penal Code occupy in the Utah Criminal Code.

In Tuttle, as in

Harding, supra, the defendant requested a jury instruction on the
compulsion defense under U.C. A. §76-2-302(1)(1953 as amended) on a
charge of escape from official custody while incarcerated at the
Utah State Prison.

The trial court gave the instruction suggested

by the prosecution, which qualified the statutory compulsion defense
by including, in the escape context, additional elements found in
the common law.

Mindful that the legislature's intent in

promulgating a new criminal code in 1973 was to abolish the common
law of crimes, the Supreme Court said that the common law still
offered interpretive assistance.

The Utah Supreme court upheld the

trial court's instruction, and because defendant failed to prevail
on the defense at trial, upheld the conviction:
[In] enacting the new criminal code, the
legislature abolished the common law of
crimes. Moreover because section 76-2-302
is based on the Model Penal Code and not on
the common law, it does not necessarily
bring in its train all the baggage
constituting the common law duress
defense. The legislature's expressed
intent to abandon the common law of crimes
and replace it with the new code might
suggest we should not resort to common law
precedents that would have been pertinent
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to interpretation of our pre-1973 criminal
statutes when faced with a situation not covered
by the current code. That argument is persuasive
when the new criminal code differs substantially
from the old statutorily enacted common law and
the reason for the difference is discernible.
However/ where the differences appear to be
largely technical and we can discern no purpose
for the diversion from the prior law, we should
be free to refer to it for such interpretive
assistance as it may offer. It would be foolish
to ignore all the evolutionary experience
represented by the common law simply because
modern draftsmen have rewritten the old law in
plainer language.
Tuttle at 633 (citations omitted);

See also Wells v. State/ 689

P.2d 346 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
Whether the defense of necessity should be available to the
criminal offense of driving under the influence is a separate
question which should be answered in the affirmative.

Several state

courts have considered cases in which the facts supported or did not
support the assertion of the defense of necessity.

See generally 64

ALR4th 298.
In Vermont/ the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for new
trial a case in which the trial court refused the defendant's
request for an instruction of the necessity defense.
Shotten/ 458 A.2d 1105 (Vt. 1983).
present case.

State v.

The facts are similar to the

The defendant was stopped and arrested for Driving

Under the Influence.

At the police station she informed the officer

she was injured/ that she had been assaulted and pushed down a
flight of stairs by her husband and was on her way to the hospital
when stopped.

She testified the telephone at her home was
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disconnected so she could not use it to call for help, and she was
unwilling to risk the short walk to her neighbor's homes and finding
them empty.

At the emergency room she was found to have multiple

rib fractures which required a hospital stay of five days.
The evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to raise a question of fact for
the jury as to whether the defendant drove
because it was reasonably conceived by her
to have been a necessity; accordingly, an
instruction on the issue should have been
given upon request . . . . [it] was the
function of the jury to determine first
whether defendant was driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, and
if she was, then to determine whether she
was justified in doing so because of
necessity. By refusing to charge the jury
on the second issue, the trial court
committed reversible error. I_d. at 1106,
1107.
In another case, however, the Supreme Court held that the
failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the necessity
defense was proper where the emergency had ceased prior to the
defendant's driving under the influence.

State v. Dapo, 470 A.2d

1173 (Vt. 1973).
Other jurisdictions have considered the necessity defense
in the context of the crime of Driving Under the Influence.

In

Oregon, the trial court was reversed where there was sufficient
evidence introduced to support the statutory choice of evils
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defense.

State v. Olson, 719 P.2d 55 (Or, 1986).

In a case of

first impression in California, the court held the necessity defense
available to one charged with misdemeanor Driving Under the
Influence.

People v. Pena, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1983).

And in New

Hampshire, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Driving While
Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor where the elements of the
statutory defense of competing harms were not established.

State v.

Fee, 489 A.2d 606 (N.H. 1985).
I

reviewing court held that the trial court

improperly denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction on
the statutory competing harms defense in a case
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.

State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (Me. 1985).

17-A M.R.S.A. §103(1) provides in pertinent part:

Conduct which the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid imminent physical harm
to himself or another is justifiable if the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such
harm outweigh, according to ordinary
standards of reasonableness, the harm
sought to be prevented by the statute
defining the crime charged.
The trial court erred when it:
"refused to give the instruction because he
determined, as a matter of law, that a
defendant who denies that he committed the
crime cannot also assert the inconsistent
defense that he did commit the crime
because he 'believe [d] it to be necessary
to avoid imminent physical harm to himself
or another, 495 A.2d at 338 (citations
omitted) f "
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The reviewing court said inconsistent defenses may be interposed in
a criminal case, whatever the tactial wisdom, and that if the
evidence was introduced for the competing harms defense then the
defendant was entitled to an instruction on it.

Ij3. at 339.

CONCLUSION
First, absent specific statutory language, an arrested
person does not have a constitutional right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be given notice of his statutory right to an additional
chemical test, a majority of jurisdictions have held.

The present

case is different, even though the Utah Statute is silent as to
notice, because police officers routinely give notice of the
statutory additional chemical test to those arrested persons who
initially refuse the officer's breath test.

The government has

created a situation where some arrested persons receive notice and
others do not and therefore, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of
Utah, the present procedure in unconstitutional.

A constitutionally

correct procedure would be that all arrested persons receive notice
of their statutory right.

The remedy for failing to provide notice

must be suppression of evidence obtained from the officer's breath
test or dismissal of the charges.
Second, the common law defense of necessity, updated in the
Model Penal Code, must be included in the Utah Criminal Code. The
similarity of the necessity defense to Utah's compulsion defense is
so great that no principled distinction between the two can be made.
-20-

Further, absent specific legislative intent, the necessity defense
should be available in the context of Driving Under the Influence.
Defendant introduced or offered evidence of a prima facie factual
basis for the instruction from the Model Penal Code,

Failure of the

court to instruct the jury on the necessity defense is reversible
error and warrants a new trial for defendant.

Respectfully submitted th is
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ADDENDUM A
ADMONITION;

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADDITIONAL CHEMICAL TEST

*

5.

;
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Subject's ability to follow instructions \ C £ ^

"N^JJ>

SEARCHES
A.
Vehicle:
Was subject's vehicle searched? \(trS>
Where? J E _ _ _ b _ _
WhPn? * 2 \ ^ ^> ^Evidence C^PgN
^ — T \ ^ CS^
Person who performed the search

^

v~r~

Subject:
Was subject's person s e a r c h e d ' H * ^ *
Where?
When?
~.l°^__,,
Evidentjg^
Person who performed the search
^ p ^ .vUrtV

lX^VV.\rv

WV^v?
^_
* ^ r" > ) ^ S o ^ " v r ^ v —
eV^C<LvO

__

V^\^~"
_______

r: ::

^ ^

^^\L£v~

CHEMICAL TE§TS:
(^Mr. or Mrs. j / X : X T T t \ , , do you understand that you are under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) "T
\ ; ^ V I ^ X S ' T S ^ >
'
I hereby request that you submit t$La chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) Cbntent of your blood. I
request that you take a
V^C^iS-*^
test.
\ / 0 x j (.c—*
x ^
(blood-breath-urine)
E'

^

_________________________^

Were tests demonstrated by officer?

B.

v -> v N

The following admonition was given by me to the si it: ject before the chemical test was administered:
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood
alcohol content or presence*of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may,
resJIt in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.

What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response:

> 4 ^ __
Did subject submit to a chemicaJ test? X ^ ^ a .
Type of test
\p£\^^
Test Administered by ^
M ^ L > r ^ \ , ( < , \ t ^ ~ A K Where? X S D - 0
Time: J _ _ A _ _
Results_____z
_Was subject notified of results? V r ^
Serial No. of test machine:

I \*CX-> V \ M O
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following)

The following admonition-was given by me to the subject
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, h6w5vef4jrujst warn you that if you refuse, your license or
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year vvitfua^provision for a limited driver's license.
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physicTarho£^°ur own choice administer
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to suBTmUo, so long as it does

ADDENDUM B
JURY INSTRUCTION;

DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION

INSTRUCTION NO,
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for
any offei ise based on the conduct.
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a
harm or evil to himself c~ * J another is justifiable, provided that
the hacni ML" ,:vil

••-••'•jht •

avoided by such conduct is greater

than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged,
Ti^:,-.

defend.

*~ ves t- o your

satisfaction

that the above elements of justification did exist, and the
prosecution does not negate the defense of oflmpulsi-on beyond a
reasonable doubt, it sha 11 fae your dut ,.y to return a vei:di ct of not
guilty.
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